The present note aims at bridging two approaches to connexive logic: one approach suggested by Heinrich Wansing, and another approach suggested by Paul Egré and Guy Politzer. To this end, a variant of FDEbased modal logic, developed by Sergei Odintsov and Heinrich Wansing, is introduced and some basic results including soundness and completeness results are established.
Introduction
Connexive logics are characterized by having so-called Aristotle's theses and Boethius' theses as derivable/valid formulas:
More recently, there are some discussions casting some doubts on the very notion of connexivity [e.g., 5, 6] , but in this note I will stick to the more conservative account of connexive logic.
In what follows, I will briefly revisit two approaches in connexive logics discussed in this note.
Background I
One of the traditions in connexive logic founded by Heinrich Wansing captures connexivity through a nonstandard falsity condition for the conditional. More specifically, Wansing suggests to take the condition of the form "if A is true then B is false" rather than the condition of the form "A is true and B is false" as the falsity condition for the conditional of the form "if A then B", where truth and falsity are not necessarily exclusive. This simple idea was first suggested in [19] in which the connexive logic C was formulated as a variant of Nelson's logic N4 [cf. 4, 18] . 1 Some later developments observed that the central idea of Wansing does not rely on N4. Indeed, Wansing's idea works in the context of a four-valued logic [cf. 20], a three-valued logic [cf. 14] , and even in the context of weak relevant logics, namely the basic relevant logic BD of Graham Priest and Richard Sylvan [cf. 13] , as well as in the context of conditional logics [cf. 7, 22] .
It should be noted that as a byproduct, connexive logics formulated à la Wansing will include the converse direction of Boethius' theses as valid/derivable theses. Of course, these formulas are not required for connexive logics in general. In fact, these formulas are sometimes criticized. 2 However, as Priest claims in [16, p. 178 ], Wansing's system is most likely to be "one of the simplest and most natural."
Background II
Another approach to connexivity in the literature is the one through experimental philosophy. In [15] , Niki Pfeifer marked the first contribution towards this direction with a more general aim to "extend the domain of experimental philosophy to conditionals" [15, p. 223 ]. 3 The particular focus is on Aristotle's theses, and Pfeifer proposes an interpretation of Aristotle's theses based on coherence based probability logic and offers a justification for Aristotle's theses.
The present note focuses on another paper [3] by Paul Egré and Guy Politzer who carried out an experiment related to the negation of indicative conditionals. 4 In particular, they consider weak conjunctive and conditional formulas of the form A ∧ ♦ ∼ B and A → ♦ ∼ B respectively, beside the more well-discussed strong conjunctive and conditional formulas of the form A∧∼ B and A → ∼ B respectively, as formulas equivalent to ∼(A → B). Many of the debates on the negation of conditionals focused on the strong forms and discussed whether the conjunctive formula is appropriate or the conditional formula is appropriate. However, Egré and Politzer challenge the debate by suggesting that we should also take into account of the weak forms, not only the strong forms.
Aim
Based on these backgrounds, the general aim behind this note is to see if we can bridge the above traditions in connexive logics. The more specific aim of this note is to observe that the formulas considered by Egré and Politzer can be formalized in a rather natural manner by following the idea of Wansing to consider falsity conditions of the conditional. To this end, we make use of a modal logic that expands the four-valued logic N4 ⊥ p (or B → 4 in the terminology of [9] ) 5 , developed by Sergei Odintsov and Heinrich Wansing in [10] . 6 
Semantics and proof theory
The languages L and L m consist of finite sets {⊥, ∼, ∧, ∨, →} and {⊥, ∼, ∧, ∨, →, , ♦} of propositional connectives respectively and a countable set Prop of propositional variables which we denote by p, q, etc. Furthermore, we denote by Form and Form m the set of formulas defined as usual in L and L m respectively. We denote a formula of both languages by A, B, C, etc. and a set of formulas of both languages by Γ , ∆, Σ, etc.
Semantics
The following semantics is obtained by making a simple change to the semantics for the modal logic BK of Odintsov and Wansing. 
Finally, the semantic consequence is now defined as follows: Σ |= A iff for all WBK-models W, R, I , and for all w ∈ W :
Remark 1. Consider the language L. Then, note that the extension N4 ⊥ p of Nelson's logic N4 ⊥ by Peirce's law is obtained by replacing the falsity condition for implication by the following condition.
This reflects the strong conjunctive formula in Egré and Politzer's terminology.
Moreover, Wansing's four-valued connexive logic MC is obtained by replacing the falsity condition for implication by the following condition.
This reflects the strong conditional formula in Egré and Politzer's terminology.
Proof Theory
We now turn to the proof theory. Since the modal logic BK is presented in terms of a Hilbert-style calculus, we follow the same strategy.
Definition 2. Consider the following axioms and rules, where:
abbreviate, respectively:
The logic WBK is defined as the deductive closure of axioms (Ax1)-(Ax20) under the rules (MP), (M ) and (M♦). We write Γ ⊢ A iff A belongs to the closure of W BK ∪ Γ under (MP).
Remark 2. Consider again the language L. Then, if we eliminate axioms (Ax16)-(Ax20) together with rules (M ) and (M♦), and replace (Ax15) by the following formula, then we obtain an axiomatization of the extension of Nelson's logic known as N4 ⊥ p :
Moreover, if we replace (Ax15) by the following formula, then we obtain an axiomatization of the system MC of Wansing:
Remark 3. As one of the referees correctly pointed out, note that the presence of is simply for the sake of presentation, especially the axiomatic proof system.
Soundness and completeness
As usual, the soundness part is rather straightforward. By induction on the length of the proof we obtain:
For the completeness proof, we first introduce some standard notions.
The following lemmas are well-known, and thus the proofs are omitted. Lemma 1. If Σ A then there is a prime WBK-theory, ∆, such that Σ ⊆ ∆ and ∆ A.
A then there is a prime WBK-theory, ∆, such that Σ ⊆ ∆ and ∆ A where Σ = {A : A ∈ Σ}. Now, we are ready to prove the completeness.
Proof. Suppose that Γ A. Then by Lemma 1, there is a Π ⊇ Γ such that Π is a prime WBK-theory and A ∈ Π. Define the model A = X, R, I , where X = {∆ : ∆ is a prime WBK-theory}, ∆RΣ iff ∆ ⊆ Σ (recall that ∆ = {A : A ∈ ∆}) and I is defined thus. For every state, Σ and propositional parameter, p:
We show that this condition holds for any arbitrary formula, B:
It then follows that A is a counter-model for the inference, and hence that Γ |= A. The proof of ( * ) is by a simultaneous induction on the complexity of B with respect to the positive and the negative clause.
For bottom. For the positive clause, note that the semantic clause is 1 ∈ I(Σ, ⊥) and that (Ax10) together with the non-triviality of Σ gives us ⊥ ∈ Σ. Therefore, we obviously have 1 ∈ I(Σ, ⊥) iff ⊥ ∈ Σ, and so, by contraposition, the desired result is proved. For the negative clause, we have the semantic clause 0 ∈ I(Σ, ⊥). Moreover, since Σ is nonempty, let D be an element of Σ. In view of (Ax11), we have ⊢ D → ∼ ⊥, and this together with D ∈ Σ implies ∼ ⊥ ∈ Σ since Σ is a prime WBK-theory. Therefore, we obtain 0 ∈ I(Σ, ⊥) iff ∼ ⊥ ∈ Σ.
For negation. We begin with the positive clause: 1 ∈ I(Σ, ∼ C) iff 0 ∈ I(Σ, C) iff ∼ C ∈ Σ (IH). The negative clause is also straightforward:
For necessity. We begin with the positive clause:
. For the last equivalence, assume C ∈ Σ, and that for all ∆ ∈ X: Σ ⊆ ∆. Then, C ∈ Σ is equivalent to C ∈ Σ , so we obtain C ∈ ∆, as desired. For the other direction, we use Lemma 2. The negative clause is also straightforward: 0 ∈ I(Σ, C) iff for some ∆ ∈ X: (ΣR∆ and 0 ∈ I(∆, C)) iff for some ∆ ∈ X:
For the equivalence ( * * ), the proof runs exactly the same with the equivalence ( * * * ) in the positive case for possibility.
For possibility. We begin with the positive clause: 1 ∈ I(Σ, ♦C) iff for some ∆ ∈ X: ΣR∆ and 1 ∈ I(∆, C) iff for some ∆ ∈ X: Σ ⊆ ∆ and C ∈ ∆ (IH) iff ♦C ∈ Σ ( * * * ).
For the equivalence ( * * * ), note first that we obtain the following by the same argument for ( * ) above.
By taking the contraposition, and noting that Σ is a prime WBK-theory, we obtain:
Therefore, in view of (Ax18), the desired equivalence is established.
The negative clause is also straightforward:
For the equivalence ( * * * * ), the proof runs exactly the same with the equivalence ( * ) in the positive case for necessity.
For disjunction. We begin with the positive clause: is a prime theory) . The negative clause is also straightforward:
For conjunction. Similar to the case for disjunction. For implication. We begin with the positive clause:
For the last equivalence (⋆), assume C → D ∈ Σ and, for reductio, that C ∈ Σ and D ∈ Σ. Then since Σ is a prime WBK-theory, Σ is closed under (MP). Therefore, we have D ∈ Σ but this contradicts to D ∈ Σ. For the other way around, just again note that Σ is a prime WBK-theory, and that C ∨ (C → D) ∈ Σ and D → (C → D) ∈ Σ.
As for the negative clause, it is similar to the positive case: 0 ∈ I(Σ, C → D) iff 1 ∈ I(Σ, C) or for some ∆ ∈ X: ΣR∆ and 0 ∈ I(∆, D) iff C ∈ Σ or for some ∆ ∈ X:
For the equivalences ( †) and ( ‡), the proof runs exactly the same with the equivalences ( * * * ) and (⋆) in the positive cases for possibility and implication. Thus, we obtain the desired result. ⊣ Remark 4. Note that we may also formulate a semantics along the weak conjunctive formula in Egré and Politzer's terminology, and establish soundness and completeness results. More specifically, we may replace the falsity condition by the following condition for the semantics: I(x, A) and for some x ∈ W : 0 ∈ I(x, B) .
For the proof theory, we replace the axiom (Ax15) by the following formula:
Once these changes are made, soundness and completeness results can be established by some obvious modifications. The details are safely left for the interested readers.
Basic observations
We now turn to observe a few basic results on WBK. First, we observe that WBK is not connexive.
Proposition 1. The following holds for WBK:
Proof. For the first item, the proof runs as follows.
1.
For the second item, it suffices to prove Proof. Just take a model with one element in which the accessibility relation is not reflexive. ⊣ However, connexivity can be characterized in a very simple manner in view of the above proposition.
Corollary 2. The extensions of WBK are connexive iff ⊢ A → ♦A.
Note also that the following restricted form of Aristotle's thesis is derivable in WBK.
In other words, this shows that Egré-Politzer-style logics have a loose connection to humble connexivity discussed by Kapsner in [6] .
Second, even though WBK is not connexive, the system is contradictory which is a general feature of connexive logics that implement Wansing's idea.
Proof. The first item is obvious in view of (Ax4). For the second item, just note that, by (Ax15), the formula is equivalent to (A ∧ ♦ ∼ A) → ♦ ∼ A which is derivable again in view of (Ax5). ⊣ Remark 5. Note that the above result requires the following theses and modus ponens:
Thus, if one is happy to defend these, then the consequence relation needs to be paraconsistent. Of course, this is not an entirely new topic. Indeed, in the discussion of connexive logics, there is a tradition in which conjunction elimination is given up in pain of triviality. 8 Third, we observe that one of the Wansing-style connexive logics can be seen as a special case of Egré-Politzer-style logics.
Proposition 3. The following holds for WBK:
Proof. For the first item, the proof is very similar to the second item of Proposition 1. For the second item, it suffices to prove 
That is, one of the Wansing-style connexive logics, namely the system MC, is obtained iff the possibility operator is trivialized in WBK.
Concluding remarks
What I hope to have established in this note is that a variation of Wansing's idea, inspired by Egré and Politzer, can be smoothly formalized in a simple setting almost for free in view of the formulation of the modal logic BK of Odintsov and Wansing. Moreover, I observed that Egré-Politzer-style systems can be seen as a generalization of the Wansingstyle connexive logic MC.
There are some future topics that seem to be interesting as well as promising. I will only note two of them. First, it is interesting to see if we can export some of the observations in this note and see if some experiments will support connexivity or not, and if contradictoriness gets supported or not along the suggestion made by Egré and Politzer. Second, it is a challenging task to explore variants of WBK by having different underlying modal logics such as those based on N4 ⊥ , instead of N4 ⊥ p . Philosophically, this will be of some interest for those who prefer indicative conditionals to be captured by the constructive conditional rather than the classical material conditional. Technically, this will require some careful discussion on the relation between two accessibility relations as in intuitionistic modal logics. I only note in relation to the technical point that we can also think of introducing a modality on top of the semantics of Nelson logics without any additional accessibility relation beside the one for the constructive conditional [cf. 12, 17] . This will be more simple technically, but it remains to be discussed if the modality so defined will be philosophically interesting in the present context.
